О месте и смысле всемирной истории в историософии Н.Я. Данилевского

Abstract

The historical and philosophical theory of cultural and historical types formulated in Danilevsky’s “Russia and Europe” is often interpreted as opposing the world history concept. This is contradicted by the fact that Danilevsky himself uses the world history concept as a working concept and, moreover, expresses his substantive judgements on this subject. In our opinion, this circumstance is not a contradiction on Danilevsky’s part. According to the approach outlined in the article, first of all “Russia and Europe” is a political treatise and the primary issue discussed in it (and the corresponding plan of consideration) is the problem of action and the subject of action. A cultural and historical type, fully developed, is formalized into a system of states or a state (with the former option being preferred by Danilevsky as providing more opportunities for development). Thus, they also act as subjects of action in themselves, but at the same time their system is also capable of acting as such (the system of international law, which in Danilevsky’s time is fundamentally limited, first as the system of international law of Christian nations and then, since the 1860s, of “civilized” ones). World history appears exclusively in terms of theoretical comprehension. It follows that it is impossible to act from world history — that is to speak on behalf of history. Danilevsky’s thesis itself appears to be complexly structured, disintegrating into two parts: the absence of such a historical subject as mankind and the impossibility to speak about “meaning in history” within the framework of positive scientific knowledge. It is noted that both parts of the thesis are autonomous and thus can be discussed separately, i.e. the refutation/rejection of one does not automatically mean the rejection of the other.