Latent in Public Mechanisms: Flaws in Lobbying Regulation in the USA
Keywords:
Lobbying, lobbying mechanisms, state regulation, vetocracy, astroturfAbstract
The aim of the article is to identify the contradictory impact of lobbying as a public institution on public policy and administration at the sectoral and regional levels of a country with established market mechanisms and a system of state support. This study is based on an analysis of legal acts regulating lobbying activities both at the federal level and at the level of states and industries. The article shows that lobbying as an integral part of the functional representation of interests in the United States has turned into an institution of public administration with a developed regulatory framework. However, when analyzing in detail the mechanisms of its functioning at the level of industries and states, practices are revealed whose influence on public policy and administration significantly diverges from legal goal-setting. An example of an industry where lobbying practices play an important role is healthcare, which has developed market mechanisms combined with an advanced system of state support and regulation. In addition, it has been established that lobbying, even with its developed normative regulation, significantly distorts free political competition, when its practices lead to the reproduction of vetocracy, and also includes such political and administrative mechanisms as astroturf and taxpayer-funded lobbying. This is especially evident at the state level. The features of lobbying regulation that affect the socio-economic development of the region and its investment attractiveness are highlighted.
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