Possibilities of Applying Methodology of the New Institutional Economics to Improve Antitrust Regulation in the Context of Digital Transformation

Possibilities of Applying Methodology of the New Institutional Economics to Improve Antitrust Regulation in the Context of Digital Transformation

Authors

Keywords:

Antitrust regulation, new institutional economics, network effects, bounded rationality, discrete structural alternatives

Abstract

Digitalization brings significant changes to economic processes: new business models are emerging; the behavior of old companies is changing. The activities of digital companies are closely related to network effects, positive and negative. The internalization of network effects expands the capabilities of digital companies, allows them to influence the market situation, occupy a dominant position and establish barriers to market entry, which can lead to market monopolization. When conducting an economic analysis of the digital companies’ activities for the purposes of antitrust regulation, it is extremely important to take into account the role of network effects, otherwise the analysis results will contain errors. Thus, in the context of digital transformation, it becomes necessary to adapt antitrust regulation systems to new realities. The article is devoted to the disclosure of the possibilities of applying the methodological approaches of the new institutional economics to improve antitrust regulation in the context of digitalization. Among these approaches, special attention should be paid to the theory of externalities, the concept of bounded rationality, and the method of discrete structural alternatives. The analysis showed that the use of the theory of externalities developed within the framework of the new institutionalism makes it possible to choose the most effective method of internalizing network effects for each specific case. The application of the bounded rationality concept in antitrust regulation allows ex ante detection of abuses by digital giants based on the use of big data and user behavior. On the grounds of the use of the discrete structural alternatives method, the antimonopoly authorities can choose both the most effective tools for theoretical analysis and make the most effective decisions in practice, which is especially important given the fact that the decisions made create rules of conduct for market participants.

Author Biographies

Leonid A. Tutov, Lomonosov Moscow State University

DSc (Philosophy), Professor, Department of Philosophy and Methodology
of Economics, Faculty of Economics, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russian Federation. 

l.tutov@yandex.ru

Alexander A. Izmaylov , Lomonosov Moscow State University

Рostgraduate student, Department of Philosophy and Methodology of
Economics, Faculty of Economics, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russian Federation.

izmaylov571@gmail.com

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Published

2021-10-30

How to Cite

Possibilities of Applying Methodology of the New Institutional Economics to Improve Antitrust Regulation in the Context of Digital Transformation. (2021). Public Administration. E-Journal (Russia), 85, 104-121. https://spajournal.ru/index.php/spa/article/view/201

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How to Cite

Possibilities of Applying Methodology of the New Institutional Economics to Improve Antitrust Regulation in the Context of Digital Transformation. (2021). Public Administration. E-Journal (Russia), 85, 104-121. https://spajournal.ru/index.php/spa/article/view/201

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